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NOTES
Public Law 86-272: Legislative Ambiguities and
Judicial Difficulties
I.

BACKGROUND

Expanding concepts of the services that state governments
should perform for their citizens have prompted within recent years
entry by the states into fields of endeavor formerly left to private
enterprise. Coupled with the upward spiral of the cost of goods and
services, expanded responsibilities undertaken by the states have
increased greatly the pressure on state taxing authorities to produce
revenues sufficient to cover expenses of government. Beset by fiscal
problems, the states have attempted to take maximum advantage
of existing revenue sources and to tap new ones.
Although sales and use taxes have been the primary source of
state tax revenue in recent years,' the corporate income tax imposed
by the majority of states' is supplying an increasingly significant
annual contribution to governmental coffers. 3 Characteristically, a
state corporate income tax is a direct levy on net income derived
from activities of the corporation within the taxing state. A state's
right to impose such a tax on a domestic corporation traditionally
has been based upon the rationale that the state has provided the
corporate entity rights and privileges for which it rightfully may ask
compensation. Problems have arisen, however, when states have
attempted to extend their taxing jurisdictions beyond their physical
boundaries, and a "tangled underbrush"4 of case law has addressed
the question whether a state may impose a tax upon a foreign corpo1. See TAX FOUNDATION, INC., FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE 19 (17th
biennial ed. 1973).
2. Forty-five states and the District of Columbia currently employ some type of corporate income tax. CCH STATE TAx GUIDE 1042 (1973).
3. The Commerce Department has reported that income taxes surpassed sales taxes as
the primary source of state revenue in 1973. Wall Street J., Jan. 9, 1974, at 1, col. 9. Individual
income tax collections totaled 19.6 billion dollars; corporate income tax collections accounted
for 5.4 billion dollars. Id., Jan. 2, 1974, at 1, col. 5. For a table revealing trends in percentage
distributions of state tax collections by source since 1902 see FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE, supra note 1, at 151.
4. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959).
Mr. Justice Clark noted that the Court had decided over 300 of these cases in slightly more
than that number of volumes of the reports. Id. at 457-58.
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ration engaged solely in interstate commerce within the taxing
state.'
The right of a state to impose a tax on income generated exclusively in interstate commerce accentuates a conflict fundamental in
a federal system-the states' need to secure tax revenue is juxtaposed to the national interest in free trade and the absence of commercial barriers between the states.' Although taxing power is inherent in sovereign bodies, the states of the United States have
divided their taxing power between the federal government and
themselves. They delegated to the federal government the exclusive
power to control interstate commerce when they gave Congress the
right "[tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States . . . .
A.

The Northwestern States Decision

Prior to 1959 it generally was accepted that the commerce
clause precluded the imposition of a state corporate income tax
upon a foreign corporation whose only activities within the taxing
state consisted of the furtherance of interstate commerce." In 1951
the Supreme Court in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor9 had
invalidated a Connecticut tax imposed on foreign corporations for
the privilege of engaging in exclusively interstate commerce, holding that the tax represented an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. This decision undoubtedly afforded substance to
the widespread assumption that any attempt by a state to impose
a tax on income generated in interstate commerce would be invalid
under the commerce clause.
In the 1959 decision of Northwestern States Portland Cement
Co. v. Minnesota, however, the Supreme Court dropped a bomb5. For a comprehensive review of the case law in this area see Developments in the
Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REv. 953
(1962).
6. See THE FEDERALIST nos. 7, 11, 22 (A. Hamilton); No. 42 (J. Madison).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.3. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 ( 1964).
9. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
10. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Consolidated for decision with the Northwestern States case
was the case of Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc. In Stockham Valves, taxpayer
was a Delaware corporation with principal office and plant located in Birmingham, Alabama.
It manufactured and sold valves and pipe fittings through established local wholesalers in
several states. Taxpayer maintained no warehouse or storage facilities in Georgia, but it did
operate a sales-service office in Atlanta, manned by one salesman who spent about a third of
his time soliciting orders for taxpayer's product in Georgia. All orders taken by the salesman
were sent to Birmingham for approval and filling. A full-time secretary also worked in this
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shell on the world of multistate business. In Northwestern States,
taxpayer was an Iowa corporation engaged in the manufacture and
sale of cement at its plant in Mason City, Iowa. Taxpayer owned
no real estate in Minnesota, maintained no bank accounts there,
and warehoused no merchandise within the state; however, it employed four salesmen who maintained a regular and systematic
course of solicitation of order&for sales of taxpayer's cement among
customers in Minnesota. All orders were sent back to Iowa for acceptance or rejection, and delivery was made from taxpayer's plant
in Mason City. The salesmen used a leased sales office in Minneapolis, which was manned by a district manager and a secretary, as a
clearinghouse for their orders. Through this system of solicitation in
Minnesota, taxpayer generated 48 percent of its total sales. Minnesota levied its state net income tax on the amount of taxpayer's
income attributable to its activities in Minnesota, as determined by
a three-factor apportionment formula." Taxpayer contended that
the imposition of this tax violated both the due process and commerce clauses of the federal constitution and therefore was invalid.
The Court sustained the tax, however, and concluded that a state
may impose a tax on net income derived from the interstate operations of a foreign corporation "provided the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within the taxing
2
state forming sufficient nexus to support the same.'
In addressing the due process challenge, the Court observed
that "the 'controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.' ,,3 The Court answered this question affirmatively in Northwestern States by noting that taxpayer
had generated 48 percent of its total sales from markets within the
taxing state. The Court, further observing that the apportionment
provided for by the Minnesota legislature properly insured that the
taxes imposed were levied only on that portion of net income arising
from taxpayer's activities within the taxing state, concluded that
these activities form a "sufficient nexus between such a tax and
transactions within a state for which the tax is an exaction."' 4
office. Georgia levied its corporate income tax on the portion of taxpayer's income attributable to its activities in Georgia. The Supreme Court rejected taxpayer's contentions that this
tax violated the due process and commerce clauses of the federal constitution.
11. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.19 (1945), as amended, (Supp. 1973). This formula, which
utilizes the 3 factors of sales, property, and payroll, is popularly known as the "Massachusetts
formula."
12. 358 U.S. at 452.
13. Id. at 465, quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
14. 358 U.S. at 464, quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940).
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Justice Clark, writing for the majority, also recognized the need
to clarify the controversy and confusion surrounding state taxation
of interstate commerce. From the "quagmire" of case law in the
area, the Court distilled the principle that states may not constitutionally impose taxes that burden or interfere with the free flow of
commerce." On the other hand, on the authority of West Publishing
Co. v. McColgan,5 the Court held that a net income tax on revenues
derived from interstate commerce does not in itself offend constitutional limitations upon state interference with such commerce. Noting further that no "multiple burden" on interstate commerce resulting from the imposition of the tax in question had been shown,
the Court refused to "deal in abstractions" regarding the effectiveness of Minnesota's apportionment formula.' 7 The Court carefully
distinguished between a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, which had been invalidated in Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor," and the direct tax on net income derived
from interstate commerce challenged in the instant case. 9 Noting
that it is not repugnant to the commerce clause to "make interstate
commerce pay its way," the Court concluded that "'taxes may be
imposed although their payment may come out of the funds derived
from petitioner's interstate business, provided the taxes are so imposed that their burden will be reasonably related to the powers of
the State and [are] non-discriminatory.' "20 The Court found that
2
the taxing statutes enacted by Minnesota met these tests. '
Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, argued that the majority's opinion was not dictated by precedent, but rather that it "broke new
ground." He pointed out that in no previous case had the Court
15. 358 U.S. at 458.
16. 328 U.S. 823 (1946), aff'g per curiam 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946).
17. 358 U.S. at 463.
18. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
19. For a thorough discussion of this distinction see W. BEAMAN, PAYING TAXES TO OTHER
STATES 8-1 to 8-8 (1963).
20. 358 U.S. at 464, quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609
(1951).
21. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan agreed that prior decisions governed the
outcome of the instant case and supported the constitutionality of Minnesota's tax. He
emphasized that the questioned tax was part of a general scheme of state income taxation
reaching all individual and corporate net income, and that the tax was "not sought to be
applied to portions of the net income of Northwestern . . .because of the source of that
income-interstate commerce-but rather despite that source." 354 U.S at 469 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Justice Harlan observed that the Court consistently had upheld state income
taxes of general application when these taxes were applied to reach only that portion of
income fairly allocable to taxpayer's activities within the taxing state, and he concluded that
the Court in the instant case did no more.
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upheld a state tax imposed on activities that are exclusively a part
of interstate commerce; rather, each prior case involved some element of intrastate activity sufficient to justify the tax. Predicting
that the majority opinion would evoke a flurry of tax legislation by
the states, Justice Frankfurter feared that the decision would produce a burden on interstate commerce for two reasons. First, he
reasoned that small or moderate-sized businesses engaged in multistate operations would be compelled to expand their legal and accounting capabilities in order to comply with the varied and everchanging taxing statutes of the several states. For many small
businesses engaged in marginal interstate operations, the increased
legal and accounting costs might prove prohibitive, forcing them to
curtail their interstate activities or to go out of business entirely.
Secondly, litigation challenging the validity of various state apportionment formulas would be increased significantly when these formulas were applied to the large number of businesses engaged in
exclusively interstate commerce. Recognizing the complexity of
federal-state fiscal conflicts, Justice Frankfurter contended that the
adjudicatory process is ill suited t6 provide resolution for these problems:
At best, this Court can only act negatively; it can determine whether a specific
state tax is imposed in violation of the Commerce Clause. Such decisions must
necessarily depend on the application of rough and ready legal concepts. We
cannot make a detailed inquiry into the incidence of diverse economic burdens
in order to determine the extent to which such burdens conflict with the
necessities of national economic life. Neither can we devise appropriate standards for dividing up national revenue on the basis of more or less abstract
principles of constitutional law, which cannot be responsive to the subtleties
of the interrelated economies of Nation and State.2

In conclusion, Justice Frankfurter argued that Congress alone possesses the resources and research machinery necessary to develop a
standard limiting state taxing power and urged that this task be left
23
to the legislative branch.
An immediate outcry arose from members of the business community in response to the NorthwesternStates decision. Taxpayers
complained that the Court had failed to define adequately the nexus
sufficient to sustain such a tax and that the states undoubtedly
would press for a standard permitting taxation of foreign corporations engaged solely in interstate commerce on the basis of minimal
22. Id. at 476 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
23. Justice Whittaker, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Stewart, filed a lengthy dissent in which he argued that prior case law failed to support the majority opinion in the
instant case and that the tax in question indeed imposed an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce. Id. at 477.
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in-state operations. They contended that a nexus standard requiring
only minimal contact with the taxing state would render haphazard
and unequal enforcement; taxpayers who drew the attention of the
state taxing authorities would be assessed and taxed, but those who
remained inconspicuous would avoid taxation. Echoing Justice
Frankfurter, small and medium-sized multistate businesses also
argued that their legal and accounting staffs were inadequate to
keep abreast of the developments in the diverse tax statutes of the
states. For many of these taxpayers, compliance costs often would
exceed: the tax liability itself, and the increased burden would compel the curtailment or discontinuance of marginal operations and
geographical consolidation of their businesses. Furthermore, the
marked differences in the income apportionment formulas of the
various states created a real possibility that a company might be
assessed on a tax base exceeding 100 percent of net income. 24 Finally, many taxpayers recognized that the Northwestern States
decision exposed many small companies to substantial retroactive
liability for assessments that went unpaid in previous years when
the constitutionality of the taxes was in doubt.2 5 Recognizing these
potentially adverse effects of the Northwestern States decision, the
business community denounced the Court's ruling as erroneous and
unfair.
B.

Enactment of Public Law 86-272

Meanwhile, the states lost no time in enacting taxing statutes
or modifying their enforcement policies to take advantage of the
newly sanctioned source of revenue.2 6 Therefore, when the Supreme
Court in the three months following the Northwestern States
decision refused two opportunities to restrict or sharpen its ruling
in that case,2 7 multistate business interests petitioned Congress for
24. For a discussion of these problems see W. BEAMAN, supra note 21, at 6-7 to 6-9. See
also Dane, Small Business Looks at Public Law 86-272 in the Perspective of Its Alternatives,
46 VA. L. REv. 1190 (1960).
25. For example, at stake in the Northwestern States case were assessments covering a
period of 15 years from 1933 to 1948 and totalling $102,000. 358 U.S. at 453, 455.
26. Almost immediately following the Northwestern States decision, Idaho, Tennessee, and Utah enacted new taxing statutes, and Kansas changed its enforcement policy to
reach income derived from exclusively interstate commerce . Note, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Public Law 86-272, 46 VA. L. REv. 297 n.3 (1960).
27. See International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La.
651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958), appeal dismissed and cert..denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959). See also ET
& WNC Transp. Co. v. Currie, 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403 (1958), afl'd mem., 358 U.S. 28
(1959).
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a legislative abrogation of the broad taxing powers ostensibly
granted to the states by the decision. Following extensive committee
hearings at which businessmen and state tax administrators presented their conflicting views and suggestions, 2 in September 1959,
within seven months after the decision in Northwestern States,
Congress passed a hastily drafted bill that was signed into law as
Public Law 86-272 .2 The sense of urgency with which the statute
28. See S. REP. No. 453, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. REP. No. 936, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959); S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); Hearingson State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce Before the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959). For a detailed account of the legislative history of Pub. L. No. 86-272 see Note,
,supra note 26, at 300-13. For an analysis of Pub. L. No. 86-272 see Hartman, State Taxation
of CorporateIncome from a Multistate Business, 13 VAND. L. REv. 21 (1959).
29. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 38184 (1970)):
§ 381. Imposition of net income tax.
(a) Minimum standards.-No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall ha e power
to impose, for any taxable year ending after September 14, 1959, a net income tax on
the income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce if the only
business activities within such State by or on behalf of such person during such taxable
year are either, or both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State
for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point
outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State
in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if orders by
such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from such
solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).
(b) Domestic corporations;persons domiciled in or residents of a State.-The provisions
of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to the imposition of a net income tax by
any State, or political subdivision thereof, with respect to(1) any corporation which is incorporated under the laws of such State; or
(2) any individual who, under the laws of such State, is domiciled in, or a
resident of, such State.
(c) Sales or solicitation of ordersfor sales by independent contractors.-For purposes of
subsection (a) of this section, a person shall not be considered to have engaged in
business activities within a State during any taxable year merely by reason of sales in
such State, or the solicitation of orders for sales in such State, of tangible personal
property on behalf of such person by one or more independent contractors, or by reason
of the maintenance, of an office in such State by one or more independent contractors
whose activities on behalf of such person in such State consist solely of making sales, or
soliciting orders for sales, of tangible personal property.
(d) Definitions.-Forpurposes of this section(I) the term "independent contractor" means a commission agent, broker, or
other independent contractor who is engaged in selling, or soliciting orders for the sale
of, tangible personal property for more than one principal and who holds himself out as
such in the regular course of his business activities; and
(2) the term "representative" does not include an independent contractor.
§ 382. Assessment of net income taxes; limitations; collection.
(a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to assess, after Septem-
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was drafted and enacted into law prompted one commentator to
describe Public Law 86-272 as "a piece of hasty, hysteria legislation
. . .pressured through the Federal Congress by a highly organized
and certainly skillfully handled group of trade organizations.""
I.

OPERATION OF PUBLIC LAW

86-272

Relying on powers granted to it .by the due process and commerce clauses, Congress had enacted Public Law.86-272.to curb the
broad state taxing power apparently sanctioned by the
NorthwesternStates decision, It viewed the statute as a temporary,
stop-gap measure 3' affording an exemption only to those foreign
corporations satisfying its conditions, and inapplicable to companies incorporated in the taxing state or corporations domiciled
there.3 2 In an attempt to define the minimum nexus necessary to
support a state's right to tax, the-statute imposes a "minimum
activities" standard which purports to limit state taxing jurisdiction. It should be noted, however, that the limitations on state taxing power apply only to taxes imposed on or measured by net income
33
from sales of tangible personal property.
Public Law 86-272 provides an umbrella of immunity from
her 14, 1959, any net income tax which was imposed by such State or political subdivision, as the case may be, for any taxable year ending on or before such date, on the
income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce, if the imposition of such tax for a taxable year ending after such date is prohibited by section 381 of
this title.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not be construed(1) to invalidate the collection, on or before September 14, 1959, of any net
income tax imposed for a taxable year ending on or before such date, or
(2) to prohibit the collection, after September 14, 1959, of any net income tax
which was assessed on or before such date for a taxable year ending on or before such
date.
§ 383. Definition.
For purposes of this chapter, the term "net income tax" means any tax imposed on, or
measured by, net income.
§ 384. Separability of provisions.
If any provision of this chapter or the application of such provision to any person or
circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter or the application of such
provision to persons or circumstances other than those to which it is held invalid, shall
not be affected thereby.
30. Roland, State Taxation of Interstate Income: A State Tax Administrator'sViewpoint, 12 TAX EXECUTIvE 35 (1959).

31. During the Senate floor debate Senator Saltonstall stated: "What the bill does, in
substance, is to put the matter in status quo until the Finance Committee, which, as I
understand it, is going to study the subject, will know whether there should be further changes
in the law or not." 105 CoNG. REc. 16354 (1959).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 381(b) (1970).
33. Id. §§ 381, 383.
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state taxing jurisdiction if the activities of the taxpayer within the
taxing state fall within either of two categories. First, a foreign
corporation enjoys the protection of the statute if its only business
activities within the taxing state consist of the solicitation of orders
for the sale of tangible personal property, which orders are sent
outside the state for approval or rejection and, if approved, are filled
by shipment or delivery from a point outside the state.34 The tax
exemption of solicitation also applies to the activities of "missionary
men" who seek orders in the name of or for the benefit of a customer.
of the taxpayer. 3 ' The legislative history of the statute, however,
indicates that the tax exemption does not extend to the maintenance by the taxpayer of a sales office within the taxing state."
Secondly, the statute provides that a taxpayer will not be considered to have exceeded the minimum activities standard merely
because sales, or solicitations of orders for sales, of tangible personal
property are made within the taxing state through an independent
contractor. 31 In contrast to the permitted activities of the taxpayer
itself, the independent contractor may complete a sale .within the
taxing state and maintain an office there without subjecting the
taxpayer to liability, as long as its activities on behalf of the taxpayer consist solely of making sales or soliciting orders for sales of
tangible personal property.
In addition, Congress addressed the problem of retroactive tax
burdens by prohibiting the assessment of taxes for prior years if
these taxes would be prohibited for taxable years after the effective
date. It did not, however, prohibit the collection of taxes already
assessed prior to the effective date of the statute.3 8 Finally, in recognition of the stop-gap character of the statute, Congress coterminously provided for the establishment of a study committee to examine the problem thoroughly and to offer suggestions for further
39
legislation in the area.
34.

Id. § 381(a).

35. Id. § 381(a)(2). An example of this situation arose in the case of Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 S. 2d 70 (1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 28 (1959), when Brown-Forman's representatives urged retailers to buy Brown-Forman
products, not directly from the company, but from wholesalers in the taxing state.
36. The original Senate bill contained a provision expressly permitting the maintenance
of "an office the primary purpose and use of which is to serve the representatives of such
persons who are engaged in the solicitation of orders [for the sale of tangible personal propertyl . . . and to receive, process and forwaid such orders." 105 CONG. REc. 16470 (1959).
This provision was stricken by an amendment on the floor of the Senate. Id. at 16477.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 381(c) (1970).
38. Id. § 382. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
39. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, tit. II, 73 Stat. 556.
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The reaction to the enactment of Public Law 86-272 paralleled
the interest expressed following the Northwestern States ruling.
Multistate business interests praised the congressional action but
complained that it did not go far enough." State tax administrators
contended that Congress had overstepped its regulatory authority
and had invaded the states' inherent power to tax." The constitutionality of the statute was challenged before the Louisiana Supreme Court in InternationalShoe Co. v. Cocreham 2 on grounds
that Congress lacked the specific authority to prohibit the states
from levying taxes for their support under the guise of regulating
interstate commerce. In the absence of this specific authority, the
state of Louisiana argued that Congress' action infringed upon
rights reserved to the states under the tenth amendment. Taxpayer
argued, and the court accordingly held, however, that Congress has
plenary power to regulate interstate commerce, and that as long as
congressional action is within the scope of its power, "fairly debatable questions as to the reasonableness, wisdom and propriety of the
legislation is not for the determination of the courts but for the
legislative body on which rests the duty and responsibility of these
decisions. 43 The court concluded that the statute represents a proper exercise of congressional authority and does not violate the tenth
amendment.
III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF

PUBLIC LAW 86-272

Public Law 86-272 provides that a foreign corporation will not
be subject to state taxation merely because of "solicitation of orders
• . . for sales of tangible personal property"" if they are only processed" within the state, or merely because of sales, or solicitations
of orders for sales, made on its behalf by an independent contractor
within the taxing state. 6 The operation of the statute therefore depends on the definitions of "solicitation of orders" and "indepen40. See Dane, note 24 supra.
41. See Cox, FederalLimit on States Taxes Is Unfairto Consuming States and to Local
Firms, 11 J. TAXATION 354 (1959). See also Roland, PublicLaw 86-272: Regulation or Raid,
46 VA. L. REv. 1172 (1960).
42. 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964). See also Smith Kline
& French Laboratories v. State Tax Comm'n, 241 Ore. 50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965); State ex rel.
Ciba Pharmaceutical Prod., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382' S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964).
43. 246 La. at 265-66, 164 So. 2d at 322.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1) (1970).
45. The exemption is granted only if orders received within the taxing state are sent
out of state for approval or rejection and if approved are filled from a point outside the state.
See id.
46. Id. § 381(c) (1970).
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dent contractor." The interpretation of these terms determines the
circumference of the umbrella sheltering out-of-state business from
taxation.
A.

Definition of Solicitation

By failing to define "solicitation" in the statute, Congress has
compelled the courts to adopt their own definitions. A liberal construction of solicitation permits a foreign corporation to conduct
many activities commonly regarded as incidental to solicitation
without sacrificing the protection of the statute. These related activities include collecting a deposit from the customer, handling
complaints, checking on credit, installation, and other similar functions. On the other hand, a narrow interpretation of solicitation
imposes a rigorous standard affording tax exemption only to companies whose sole activity within the taxing state is the actual solicitation of orders from potential customers.
In practice the protection of Public Law 86-272 usually is invoked in one of two circumstances. A foreign corporation may contend that its activities within the taxing state do not exceed "solicitation," and that it is exempt from taxation." On the other hand, a
domestic corporation may argue that because its activities in a foreign state exceed solicitation and render it subject to taxation there,
it should be allowed to allocate a portion of its income to the foreign
state and thereby reduce the amount of income subject to taxation
in its home state." In either circumstance, the breadth of the interpretation of solicitation often is determinative of the outcome of the
case.
1. Invocation of Public Law 86-272 by Foreign
Corporations.-The state courts of Oregon have interpreted Public
Law 86-272 on several occasions, and an examination of their decisions illustrates the judicial uncertainty in the area. In the early
case of Smith Kline & French Laboratores v. State Tax
Commission,4 9 the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the activities
of taxpayer corporation in the state were within the protective solicitation provision and that the corporation therefore was exempt from
47. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ciba Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., v. State Tax Comm'n, 247
Ore. 404, 430 P.2d 998 (1967); Smith Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Comm'n, 241
Ore. 50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965).
48. See, e.g., Tonka Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 284 Minn. 185, 169 N.W.2d
589 (1969); Cal-Roof Wholesale, Inc., v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Ore. 435, 410 P.2d 233 (1966);
John Ownbey Co. v. Butler, 211 Tenn. 366, 365 S.W.2d 38 (1963).
49. 241 Ore. 50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965).
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taxation under the federal statute. Plaintiff taxpayer, a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products in interstate commerce, maintained no office, office equipment, stock of goods, telephone listing, mailing address, or
automobile within the state of Oregon; however, it did employ six
resident representatives, paid their expenses, and provided them
with samples and sales material. The primary function of these
representatives was sales promotion; " they solicited orders only on
rare occasions. Oregon customers placed orders with taxpayer at its
home office in Philadelphia where they were accepted and filled.
The Oregon Tax Commission having assessed a deficiency against
taxpayer under the state corporate income tax, taxpayer claimed
exemption under Public Law 86-272.
The Tax Commission contended that the federal statute creates
an "island of immunity" around the solicitation activity; that solicitation requires that an actual order be sought by an individual
calling on a potential customer; and that the activities of taxpayer's
representatives, who merely encouraged the placing of orders with
the wholesale drug firms selling taxpayer's products, did not qualify
taxpayer for exemption. 51 Taxpayer argued, however, that its employees in Oregon did solicit orders within the meaning of Public
Law 86-272 and that the statute does not require the receipt of an
order by taxpayer's representatives so long as they were soliciting
and encouraging the purchase of taxpayer's product. 52 The court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute 3 and found that the activities of taxpayer's employees did not exceed the intended scope
of the solicitation provision. The court, citing legislative history,
concluded that "Congress intended to exempt not only the specifically described phase of interstate sales efforts but also all lesser,
included phases." Furthermore, the court considered the nature of
taxpayer's business and concluded that by encouraging the use and
sale of its products, these representatives perform the same sales
function in the pharmaceutical field that salesmen soliciting actual
50. These "detail men" visited hospitals and other institutions, doctors, and retail and
wholesale druggists for the purpose of explaining the usefulness of taxpayer's products and
encouraging their use and sale.
51. 241 Ore. 50, 54-55, 403 P.2d 375, 377 (1965).
52. Id. at 55, 403 P.2d at 377.
53. The constitutionality of the statute was challenged on both due process and commerce clause grounds. The court rejected both of these arguments. Id. at 56-59, 403 P.2d at
378-79.
54. Id. at 55, 403 P.2d at 377 (emphasis added), quoting 1 Ore. T.R. 532, 541 (1964).
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orders from the ultimate user perform in other businesses. 55 The

court thus adopted a rather liberal interpretation of solicitation,
including "all lesser, including phases" under the protective provisions of Public Law 86-272.
The liberal construction of solicitation proved short-lived in
Oregon, however, as the validity of the Smith Kline standard was
eroded significantly by the 1967 decision of Herff Jones Co. v. State
Tax Commissioner." In HerffJones, taxpayer was a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture of school class rings, which it sold
in interstate commerce. Taxpayer entered a contract with Master
Engravers, Inc. (Masters), making the latter the franchise agent for
taxpayer in Oregon and other western states. Four resident Oregon
salesmen handled taxpayer's product and also sold merchandise for
Masters and other companies. These salesmen regularly called on
schools to solicit orders for taxpayer's products and secured a fivedollar deposit on each ring sold. Orders were sent by the salesmen
to Indianapolis where they were accepted and filled. In addition to
the collection of the initial deposit, the salesmen occasionally collected the balance and forwarded it to taxpayer or to Masters. Taxpayer maintained no office, place of business, or telephone listing
in Oregon, and owned no property there except the salesmen's samples. When Oregon levied its corporate income tax on the net income generated by taxpayer's activities within the state, taxpayer
claimed the exemption of Public Law 86-272.
Having initially decided that taxpayer's salesmen were not independent contractors,57 the Supreme Court of Oregon addressed
the issue whether the activity of the salesmen in Oregon fell within
the definition of solicitation. The court repudiated the broad construction of solicitation employed by the Smith Kline court and
stated that in order to be protected by the statute, the only business
activity that taxpayer's sales representatives could engage in is the
solicitation of orders. It found, however, that the representatives'
activities were not so limited." Noting that the salesmen customarily secured an initial deposit on rings sold and occasionally collected
the balance due, the court held that taxpayer's activities in Oregon
exceeded solicitation and failed to qualify for the exemption afforded by Public Law 86-272. The court thus rejected the broad "all
55.
56.
57.
question
58.

Id. at 56, 403 P.2d at 378.
247 Ore. 404, 430 P.2d 998 (1967).
Id. at 410, 430 P.2d at 1000-01. For a discussion of the independent contractor
see text accompanying notes 89-91 infra.
247 Ore. at 412, 430 P.2d at 1002.
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lesser, included activities" standard of Smith Kline and in its place
adopted a narrow, restrictive view of solicitation. Although the court
declined to supply a definition of solicitation, it found that the
salesmen's activities exceeded the scope of activities intended for
protection under the federal statute. The judicial interpretation of
solicitation by the Oregon Supreme Court thus appears to have
come full circle since the Smith Kline decision.
The Oregon Tax Court reiterated the narrow construction of
solicitation in the 1968 decision of Briggs & Stratton Corp. v.
Commissioner." Taxpayer, a Delaware corporation with its principal office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was engaged in the manufacture and sale of gasoline engines. It sold its engines to ten customers
in Oregon, nine of whom were equipment manufacturers who used
taxpayer's engines to provide motive power for their products. The
other customer, Tracey & Co., was a central warehouse distributor
who acted as an independent contractor handling taxpayer's products as well as products of other manufacturers. Taxpayer's only
representative in Oregon was a salaried sales and service supervisor
who lived in Washington and spent approximately one of every eight
weeks in Oregon. This supervisor contacted the nine equipment
manufacturers, offered them engineering advice, and encouraged
them to buy Briggs & Stratton engines. He also maintained a close
liaison with Tracey & Co., assisting it with any problems and insuring that its inventory was adequate. In addition, the supervisor
conducted three or four service schools each year for the benefit of
Tracey personnel and other distributors and dealers. Two other
members of taxpayer's organization traveled to Oregon from Milwaukee to participate in these schools. Aside from these activities,
taxpayer maintained no office and owned no property in Oregon,
and all Oregon orders were accepted in Wisconsin and filled by
shipment from its plant in Milwaukee.
Faced with a claim of exemption under Public Law 86-272, the
Oregon Tax Court examined the activities of taxpayer's supervisor
in light of the strict solicitation standard set forth in Herff Jones.
Deeming it unnecessary to decide whether Tracey & Co. satisfied
the independent contractor exemption because of its finding that
taxpayer's sales and service supervisor does more than solicit orders
in Oregon,6" the court concluded that taxpayer failed to qualify for
the exemption and sustained the tax. Although the activities of
59.
60.

3 Ore. T.R. 174 (1968).
Id. at 180.
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taxpayer's supervisor in Briggs & Stratton appeared to exceed even
the most generous definition of solicitation, the language of the
Oregon Tax Court confirmed its adherence to the strict standard of
Herff Jones.
Several other states also have attempted to clarify the ambiguities of Public Law 86-272. An examination of their efforts will highlight the difficulties generated by faulty statutory draftsmanship by
Congress. In State ex rel. Ciba PharmaceuticalProducts, Inc. v.
State Tax Commission,6 ' the Missouri Supreme Court grappled
with the definition of solicitation in a factual situation reminiscent
of Smith Kline. Taxpayer corporation, a New Jersey pharmaceutical house with its main office in Summit, New Jersey, was engaged
in the manufacture and sale of drugs. It employed about twelve
"professional service representatives" to solicit orders from Missouri
druggists and hospital pharmacists. These orders were sent to taxpayer's home office in New Jersey for approval and were filled by
shipment from taxpayer's warehouse in Chicago. While soliciting
orders from retail druggists, the representatives frequently distributed promotional brochures and assisted the pharmacist in taking
inventory. In addition, they visited or "detailed" doctors in their
territories, explaining the therapeutic value of taxpayer's products
when prescribing medicine for their patients.
When the Missouri State Revenue Department assessed its corporate income tax on the income generated by its activities in Missouri, taxpayer invoked Public Law 86-272. The State Tax Commission contended, however, that taxpayer's activities in Missouri exceeded solicitation and that the exemption was unavailable. The
court, recognizing the paucity of precedent interpreting the statute,
stated that no court cases or legal authorities were available which
could be of any substantial assistance in determining the scope of
the statute's protection, and observed that "about the most that can
be said in describing this statute is that it was hastily enacted, not
very clear, and is considerably restricted in its scope . .
"..,
The
court noted that no business or financial transactions occurred as a
part of the representatives' promotional activities and that no taxable income was produced or any intrastate commerce conducted.
Apparently disregarding any promotional activity by the taxpayer
that did not result directly in the transfer of money or product, the
court concluded that the only financial transactions consisted of
interstate commerce within the minimum standard protected by
61.
62.

382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964).
Id. at 652.
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the statute. The court also rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of Public Law 86-27263 and upheld taxpayer's exemption.
The Missouri court's approach to the problem of defining solicitation parallels the "all lesser, included phases" standard of Smith
Kline but presents a sharp contrast to the strict standard of Herff
Jones. There seems to be little doubt that the activities held to be
exempt by the Ciba Pharmaceuticalscourt would have exceeded
solicitation under the standard now prevailing in Oregon. The interpretive dichotomy between these two states exemplifies the
shortcoming of Public Law 86-272 and amplifies the need for a uniform legislative or judicial definition of solicitation.
The seeming disregard by the Ciba Pharmaceuticalscourt of
the promotional activities carried on by taxpayer's representatives
may be contrasted to the later decision of the Superior Court of New
Jersey in the case of Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley. 4 In Clairol, taxpayer
was a Delaware corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of
cosmetics and beauty aids. Taxpayer employed a number of "detail
men" who visited retail druggists and arranged promotional aisplays of taxpayer's products. They also carried promotional brochures and free samples, which were distributed to taxpayer's customers. In addition, the detail men occasionally took inventory of
the druggist's stock of Clairol products and from this inventory
wrote up a suggested order. Furthermore, taxpayer employed other
representatives who called on beauty salons that purchased Clairol
products from wholesalers to whom it sold. Although these representatives rarely solicited orders, they possessed technical backgrounds and taught the beauty salon operators new techniques for
the use of these products.
New Jersey assessed its corporation business tax against taxpayer, the measure of which was the total of the tax computed on
the basis of allocated net worth and that computed on the basis of
allocated net income. Contending that its activities within New
Jersey did not exceed the definition of solicitation, taxpayer argued
that Public Law 86-272 specifically invalidated that portion of the
tax measured by allocated net income and inferentially invalidated
the portion measured by allocated net worth. The Superior Court
of New Jersey, noting that the statute applies only to taxes on or
measured by net income, summarily rejected the contention that it
inferentially prohibited the portion of the tax measured by allocated
63. Id. at 654-57.
64. 109 N.J. Super. 22, 262A.2d213 (Super Ct.), affd, 57 N.J. 199, 270A.2d702 (1970),
appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971).

19741

PUBLIC LAW 86-272

net worth. The court proceeded to examine the various duties performed by taxpayer's detail men and representatives in the course
of their jobs and concluded that Clairol's business activities in the
state extend beyond the mere solicitation of orders either on its own
behalf or on behalf of its wholesalers." In contrast to the court in
Ciba Pharmaceuticals,the New Jersey court examined the promotional activities of taxpayer's representatives and stated:
That increased public favor of Clairol's products will eventually result in increased orders from retail druggists to wholesalers and from wholesalers to
Clairol, or as in the case of its hair products from beauty salons to "beauty
jobbers" and from the latter to Clairol, does not blanket all Clairol's activities
with the protection afforded by the federal act to cases where the only business
of the taxpayer is the solicitation of orders. 6

The court, expressly rejecting the broad interpretation of solicitation set forth in Smith Kline and Ciba Pharmaceuticalsand adopting the narrow Herff Jones interpretation, concluded that taxpayer's activities in New Jersey exceeded solicitation and were subject to taxation.
Following the examples of the Herff Jones decision in Oregon
and the Clairol decision in New Jersey, the Supreme Court of Arkansas adopted a restrictive construction of solicitation when it interpreted Public Law 86-272 in Hervey v. AMF Beaird, Inc. 7 In
Hervey, taxpayer, a Delaware corporation with its principal office
in Shreveport, Louisiana, was engaged in the manufacture and sale
of propane gas storage tanks. The retailers to whom taxpayer sold
maintained on consignment an inventory in taxpayer's products.
Taxpayer employed a salesman who made monthly calls on retail
dealers in Arkansas, checked the retailers' inventory, solicited orders, billed the retailers as he sold taxpayer's products to the public,
and occasionally accepted payment on behalf of taxpayer. The orders were sent to the home office in Louisiana for acceptance or
rejection.
When the Arkansas Commissioner of Revenues assessed the
state's corporate income tax against the amount of income generated by its activities in Arkansas, taxpayer claimed exemption
under Public Law 86-272. The trial court granted taxpayer's motion
for summary judgment on the ground that the tax was barred by the
federal statute. On appeal the Supreme Court of Arkansas observed
that legislative history and prior court decisions in other states"8
65. 109 N.J. Super. at 30, 262 A.2d at 217-18.
66. Id. at 30, 262 A.2d at 218.
67. 250 Ark. 147, 464 S.W.2d 557 (1971).
68. The Arkansas court cited the following decisions: Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley, 109 N.J.
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indicated that solicitation was to be narrowly interpreted. Thus,
utilizing a strict standard, the court found that the salesman exceeded solicitation when he regularly checked inventories of retailers selling taxpayer's products. In addition, the court noted that
taxpayer had failed to show that under its consignment agreement
with the retailers its activities were restricted to solicitations of
orders for sales of tangible personal property. Rather than rendering
a definitive decision, the court reversed the trial court's summary
judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
These cases exemplify the difficulty that courts have experienced in interpreting Public Law 86-272. The congressional failure
to provide a definition of solicitation has created uncertainty for
taxpayer and tax administrator alike, and it is likely that many
taxpayers in doubt about their tax liability fail to file returns at all."
2. Invocation of Public Law 86-272 by Domestic Corporations.-Although Public Law 86-272 is most commonly invoked by
a foreign corporation attempting to avoid taxation of income generated by its activities in the taxing state, domestic corporations have
claimed the exemption as well to avoid taxation through apportionment of net income from a multistate business. The difficulties with
the interpretation of solicitation have been no less, however, when
domestic corporations have relied on the statute to apportion part
of their income to other states. Characteristically, the domestic corporation contends that its activities in a foreign state exceed solicitation and render it taxable there; therefore, in order to avoid multiple taxation on the same income, 7 the taxpayer should be able to
apportion part of its income to the foreign state and thereby reduce
the amount subject to taxation in its home state.
The Supreme Court of Oregon encountered this argument in
the 1966 decision of Cal-Roof Wholesale, Inc. v. State Tax
Commission." Taxpayer, an Oregon corporation, was a distributor
of building materials in Oregon and Washington. It conducted operations in Washington through a salesman living in that state whose
chief activity was the solicitation of orders that were approved at
the Oregon home office. The salesman on numerous occasions collected delinquent accounts, made pickups of returned merchandise,
Super. 22, 262 A.2d 213 (1970); Herff Jones Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 247 Ore. 404, 430 P.2d
998 (1967); Cal-Roof Wholesale, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Ore. 435, 410 P.2d 233 (1966).
69. See note 101 infra.
70. For a general discussion of apportionment formulas and how they operate see W.
BEA AN, supra note 19, at 3-1 to 3-21.
71. 242 Ore. 435, 410 P.2d 233 (1966).
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and customarily carried with him a supply of small items that he
sold and delivered in Washington. In addition, he occasionally extended spot credit and accepted orders rather than submitting them
for acceptance at the home office in Oregon. Taxpayer also regularly
entered into cooperative advertising agreements in Washington with
its Washington customers. When the Oregon Tax Commission assessed its corporate excise tax on its total unapportioned net income, taxpayer argued that it should be able to deduct from its net
income subject to taxation in Oregon that portion attributable to its
operations in Washington. The Tax Commission, relying on the
broad interpretation of the Public Law 86-272 solicitation exemption as it had been set forth in the prior Smith Kline decision,
contended that the activities of taxpayer's salesman in Washington
were within the definition of solicitation and that taxpayer therefore
was immune from taxation in that state and its income was not
subject to apportionment. Consequently, the Commission argued
that all of taxpayer's income should be taxable in Oregon.
The court expressly repudiated the Tax Commission's analysis
of the Smith Kline decision, however, as a broad interpretation of
solicitation for purposes of Public Law 86-272. Emphasizing the
statutory language that requires that solicitation be the "only
business activities" within the state, the court stated: "While we
need not and do not here decide whether plaintiff's activities in
Washington were wholly inter-state or at least in significant part
intra-state, its Washington activities clearly encompassed more
than 'solicitation' only."72 As a result, taxpayer was found to be
subject to a potential tax in Washington (although Washington at
that time had no such tax), 3 and a tax by Oregon on taxpayer's total
net income would subject it to a risk of multiple taxation. The court
therefore invalidated the Oregon tax on the portion of taxpayer's
income attributable to its activities in Washington.
The facts of a more recent apportionment case before the Oregon Supreme Court again indicate the measure of uncertainty with
which taxing authorities regard Public Law 86-272. In Iron Fireman
Manufacturing Co. v. State Tax Commission,74 taxpayer was an
Oregon corporation engaged in the manufacture of airplane parts
which it sold to the Boeing Aircraft company in Seattle, Washington. Orders for taxpayer's products were not solicited in the normal
72. Id. at 448, 410 P.2d at 239.
73. The court observed that "the test of constitutionality is not based on tax laws the
state of Washington has actually enacted." Id. at 447, 410 P.2d at 239.
74. 251 Ore. 227, 445 P.2d 126 (1968).
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business fashion because of their specialized character and because
of the long history of dealings between the Iron Fireman and Boeing
companies. The extremely technical nature of the work required
taxpayer's manager and specialists for both companies to maintain
close contact. As a result, taxpayer's production engineers, metallurgists, quality control managers, and assembly supervisors spent
several weeks of the year working closely with Boeing in Seattle. The
contractual agreement with Boeing required taxpayer to retain a
skilled metallurgist who had been trained by Boeing to be familiar
with Boeing's needs and requirements. In addition, taxpayer furnished parts pursuant to contracts that had been negotiated and
executed in Seattle rather than being sent back to Oregon for approval or rejection. When the Oregon State Tax Commission assessed its corporate income tax against taxpayer's total net income,
taxpayer conceded tax liability on income attributable to its Oregon
operations but maintained that it was entitled to exclude from income taxable in Oregon that portion generated by its activities in
Washington. The Oregon Tax Commission opposed this apportionment of income on the ostensibly untenable ground that taxpayer's
activities in Washington did not exceed solicitation and that Public
Law 86-272 therefore rendered taxpayer immune from taxation in
that state.
The Oregon Supreme Court initially noted that prior case law
and legislative history indicated that solicitation as provided for in
Public Law 86-272 was intended to have a narrow construction. In
summary fashion the court held that taxpayer's "mutual endeavor"
with Boeing in Washington greatly exceeded the mere solicitation
of orders and concluded that taxpayer was entitled to apportion its
income to Washington. 75 The court further noted that the execution

of contracts in Washington failed to satisfy the statutory requirement that all orders be accepted or rejected outside the taxing state;
however, the court declined to rest its decision on this ground but
preferred instead to rely on a finding that taxpayer's activities in
Washington exceeded solicitation. Although the court in this case
nominally subscribed to the narrow Herff Jones interpretation of
solicitation, taxpayer's activities in Washington appear to have exceeded even the most generous interpretation of that term. Perhaps
the most amazing facet of this case is that the Oregon Tax Commission advanced the Public Law 86-272 argument at all.
75.
76.

Id. at 232, 445 P.2d at 128.
Id. at 233, 445 P.2d at 129.
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A Georgia corporation also has employed Public Law 86-272 as
justification for apportioning its income to states outside Georgia.
In Hawes v. William L. Bonnell Co., 77 taxpayer, a Georgia corporation, attempted to apportion its income under a state statute78 permitting apportionment if the taxpayer was "doing business" in another state. Taxpayer made 92 percent of its gross sales to customers
outside Georgia. It maintained corporate sales agencies in New York
and Florida, employed sales representatives who operated from offices in their homes in five different states, and shipped inventory
to several out-of-state retailers who held taxpayer's product on consignment until it was sold. The State Revenue Commissioner contended that taxpayer's activities in other states did not constitute
"doing business" and that taxpayer therefore was not eligible to
apportion its income. Taxpayer argued first that its activities in
states outside Georgia constituted doing business under the Georgia
apportionment statute as interpreted by prior case law. Secondly,
taxpayer maintained that its out-of-state activities exceeded solicitation under Public Law 86-272 and rendered it liable for taxation
in other states; therefore, it should be permitted to apportion its
income to states outside Georgia.
The Court of Appeals of Georgia held, based on prior case law
interpreting the state income apportionment statute, that these activities constituted "doing business" outside Georgia and entitled
taxpayer to apportion its income. Addressing taxpayer's Public Law
86-272 argument, however, the court implied in dicta that the federal statute is not applicable to a domestic corporation attempting
to apportion its income to a foreign state:
The federal Act at best only impliedly modified the [Georgia income
apportionment statute] insofar as a foreign corporation's activities within the
state are concerned. The fact that attempting to tax a foreign corporation
under that provision might now run afoul of the federal statute would not
affect the provision as to Georgia corporations with described activities in
other states. The federal law does not endeavor to preempt that area. It did
not in any manner relate to the Act's provisions insofar as a domestic corporation was concerned. 7'

Although the court in this case did permit taxpayer to apportion
taxable income to its out-of-state operations, the court indicated
that Public Law 86-272 had no application whatsoever to domestic
corporations seeking to apportion income.
In 1963, the Tennessee Supreme Court examined the Public
77.
78.
79.

116 Ga. App. 184, 156 S.E.2d 536 (1967).
GA. CODE ANN. § 923113 (1961), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
116 Ga. App. at 191, 156 S.E.2d at 541.
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Law 86-272 exemption in the case of John Ownbey Co. v. Butler"
and rendered what appears to be a clearly erroneous decision. The
case consolidated actions by four separate companies, each of which
was seeking a refund on its state excise tax. The tax in question was
computed according to a three-factor apportionment formula, one
of the factors being sales. Gray & Dudley, taxpayer in one of the
consolidated actions, was a Tennessee corporation engaged in manufacturing and marketing appliances. Approximately 95 percent of
its sales were made to customers in other states. Most of these outof-state sales were made through the solicitation of orders, which
were accepted in Tennessee, and by delivery through channels of
interstate commerce. Some sales were made through independent
warehouses located in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
Louisiana, and California. In addition, taxpayer made a few of its
out-of-state sales through its agents located in Louisiana and New
York. Taxpayer's product was shipped to warehouses owned by its
agents in these two states, and the agents made sales and deliveries
from their warehouse inventory. The agents accepted payment for
these sales and made monthly payments and inventory reports to
taxpayer. Relying on these facts, taxpayer contended that its activities in foreign states exceeded solicitation as used in Public Law 86272, rendering it subject to taxation in those states; therefore, taxpayer argued, it should be entitled to apportion its taxable income
to its operations in the foreign states.
Dealing with the applicability of Public Law 86-272, the Tennessee Supreme Court observed that prior to the statute's adoption
in 1959, the state had not attempted to tax the portion of income
that a taxpayer could attribute to its activity in other states. The
court noted, however, that the federal statute denies to states the
right to impose a net income tax on income derived from interstate
commerce if the business activity within the taxing state consists
only of solicitation of orders for the sale of tangible personal property. The court concluded in cursory fashion that taxpayer's activities outside Tennessee fell within the definition of solicitation and
that they therefore were exempt from taxation in the foreign states.
As a result, the court held that taxpayer's total earnings should be
apportioned to Tennessee.
It seems apparent that ownership of warehouses and maintenance of inventories in Louisiana and New York clearly exceeded
the scope of solicitation exempted by Public Law 86-272. The court,
80.

211 Tenn. 366, 365 S.W.2d 33 (1963).
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however, chose to ignore these operations in its effort to label taxpayer's out-of-state activities as mere solicitation:
Gray & Dudley shows that a very small portion of its business is conducted
from out-of-state locations. The portion of the business which might be considered as being done there is so small that it really does not make any difference
or show that the apportionment formula should follow.8 '

This de minimis approach to the solicitation question appears
unique and is unsupported in legislative history and other judicial
interpretations of the statute. Moreover, it appears certain that the
drafters did not intend to include ownership of warehouses and
storage of inventory within the definition of solicitation for the pur2
pose of the exemption.
These judicial opinions offer examples of the difficulty that
courts have experienced in dealing with the meaning of solicitation.
Moreover, the inconsistent results reached by these courts highlight
the need for a standard definition of this crucial statutory concept.
B.

Definition of "Independent Contractor"

Public Law 86-272 provides that a foreign corporation will not
be subject to taxation because of sales, or solicitations of orders for
sales, made on its behalf by an independent contractor within the
taxing state.Y In addition, the statute expressly allows the independent contractor to maintain an office in the taxing state without
subjecting the foreign corporation to taxation. 4 It should be noted,
however, that although the making of sales and maintenance of an
office by the independent contractor within the taxing state will not
violate the terms of the exemption, his efforts on behalf of the foreign taxpayer otherwise are limited to solicitation. 5 Unlike the term
"solicitation," the statute does define the term "independent contractor." For purposes of the statute an independent contractor is
defined as "a commission agent, broker, or other independent contractorwho is engaged in selling, or soliciting orders for the sale of,
tangible personal property for more than one principal and who
holds himself out as such in the regular course of his business activities ... .""8 Since this definition embodies the very word it at81. Id. at 381, 365 S.W.2d at 39.
82. "It [the statute] does not prohibit taxation if the company has a warehouse in the
State or other physical facilities ... for the purpose of implementing the sale of goods." 105
CONG. REc. 16355 (1959) (remarks of Senator Byrd).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 381(c) (1970).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 381(d)(1) (emphasis added).
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tempts to define, it has been criticized by commentators as limited
8
in value. 1
The Supreme Court of Oregon confronted the problem of defining the term independent contractor as employed in Public Law 868
272 in the decision of Herff Jones Co. v. State Tax Commission."
Taxpayer was a foreign corporation engaged in the sale of school
class rings in Oregon through a contractual agreement with Master
Engravers, Inc., an Oregon corporation. The representatives of Masters sold taxpayer's products as well as products of other companies.
Under the terms of its contract with Masters, taxpayer required the
representatives to post fidelity bonds, to carry automobile insurance
for its benefit, and to agree not to compete with it if the contract
were terminated. Taxpayer also had the right to control the representatives' sales territories and to approve hiring and firing of the
sales representatives and the sales manager. Finally, taxpayer furnished order blanks, samples, and sample cases to the representatives. Claiming a tax exemption in Oregon under the federal statute,
taxpayer contended that the sales representatives of Masters were
independent contractors under the meaning of that statute.
The Supreme Court of Oregon noted that because of the circularity of the statutory definition, it was necessary to look to its own
case law for assistance in defining the term "independent contractor." 9 The court observed that the single most important factor
distinguishing between an independent contractor and an employee
is the right to control or interfere with the manner and method of
accomplishing the result-not the actual exercise of control. Under
this test, the court concluded that it was apparent that taxpayer's
representatives were not independent contractrs. 0
Adopting a similar approach to define independent contractor,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota addressed the problem in the 1969
decision of Tonka Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxation.9' Taxpayer,
a Minnesota corporation engaged in the manufacture of toy metal
vehicles, sold its products throughout the country, primarily to
wholesalers and large retailers, through sales representatives oper87. See, e.g., Note, supra note 26, at 318.
88. 247 Ore. 404, 430 P.2d 998 (1967). For a previous discussion of this case regarding
the definition of solicitation see notes 56-58 supra.
89. 247 Ore. at 409, 430 P.2d at 1000.
90. Id. The court, having held that taxpayer's representatives were not independent
contractors, also found that their activities went beyond mere solicitation. Taxpayer, therefore, was without the protection from taxation afforded by Public Law 86-272. 247 Ore. at
412, 420 P.2d at 1002.
91. 284 Minn. 185, 169 N.W.2d 589 (1969).
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ating out of rented offices located in eight major cities. Each representative was compensated by taxpayer on a commission basis and
was assigned to an exclusive sales territory. Although the representatives were forbidden by contract with taxpayer from handling competing product lines, they did sell noncompeting products of other
manufacturers. The representatives solicited and negotiated orders,
which, with the exception of some orders approved in New York by
taxpayer's credit manager, were all sent to taxpayer's home office
in Minnesota for approval. In addition, the representatives assisted
in collection matters, arranged whole-car shipments to reduce shipping costs for customers, worked out adjustments for defective merchandise claims by customers, and maintained permanent displays
of taxpayer's products in their offices. They also assisted taxpayer's
advertising agency in allocating television advertising time for its
products. Taxpayer maintained a special leased sales office in New
York at the site of an annual toy fair. About fifteen percent of
taxpayer's annual sales orders were placed during the toy fair and
half of these were approved and accepted in New York by its credit
manager.
When Minnesota computed income tax liability on taxpayer's
total income, taxpayer filed for refunds contending that it was a
corporation whose "trade or business [is] carried on partly within
and partly without this state," entitling it to apportion its income
according to the state income apportionment statute. 2 The Commissioner of Taxation contended, however, that taxpayer's representatives in foreign states were independent contractors and that
taxpayer therefore was ineligible to apportion its income. The state
further argued that all contractual agreements referred to the representatives as independent contractors and that sales by and through
them did not constitute taxable business activities under Public
Law 86-272; therefore, the state contended, the making of those
sales could not be categorized as carrying on a trade or business
outside of Minnesota.
The Minnesota Supreme Court initially recognized that the
distinction between an agent and an independent contractor is a
question of fact. The court looked to the Restatement (Second) of
Agency 3 and noted that the right to exercise control is the fundamental element of the agency relationship. The court then observed
that although taxpayer's New York representative possessed many
of the characteristics of an independent contractor,
92.
93.

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.19 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
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he could not deal in competing products; he performed a great many customer
services; he aided [taxpayer] in setting up its advertising program;
[taxpayer], in effect, paid a large portion of his rental expense for office space;
and his offices were used by [taxpayer] as its New York sales headquarters
during the annual toy fair. This evidence indicates that the Tax Court was not
unreasonable in concluding that [taxpayer's] relationship with its New York
representative was such that he could be fairly characterized as [taxpayer's]
agent or employee, [and not an independent contractor] and that sales made
through him amounted to business carried on without this state."

Addressing the state's argument based on Public Law 86-272, the
court stated that "the evidence amply supports a finding that at
least [taxpayer's] New York sales representative was more like an
employee than an independent contractor. Therefore, subsections
(c) and (d) of section 381 would be inapplicable."9 5 Having found
that the New York sales representative was an employee and not an
independent contractor, the court concluded that Public Law 86-272
would not exempt taxpayer from taxation in New York, and to avoid
multiple taxation, taxpayer was entitled to apportion its income to
its business activities outside Minnesota."
Although the statutory definition of independent contractor
found in Public Law 86-272 could have been improved by more
skillful legislative drafting, it does not appear that courts have experienced unreasonable difficulty in applying the term. Unlike the
term "solicitation," the relevant definition of "independent contractor" may be inferred from other legal contexts. 7 In addition, the
terms "commission agent" and "broker," included in the statutory
definition,98 generally are well understood and afford a workable
standard by which the relationship between a taxpayer and his
representative may be measured."
94. 284 Minn. at 191, 169 N.W.2d at 594.
95. Id. at 193, 169 N.W.2d at 594.
96. The court stated that although the evidence supporting the employee status of
taxpayer's other sales representatives was much weaker, the parties had stipulated that if
taxpayer was found to be entitled to apportion its income resulting from one of its out-ofstate representatives, it would be permitted to apportion all its income resulting from sales
by these representatives. Id. at 193, 169 N.W.2d at 595.
97. See, e.g., A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 43.00-.52 (1967); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 2, 220 (1958). In the decision of NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America,
390 U.S. 254 (1968), the Supreme Court applied common-law agency principles to distinguish
between an employee and an independent contractor in the absence of a statutory definition:
In such a situation as this there is no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be
applied to find the answer, but all the incidents of the relationship must be assessed and
weighed with no one factor being decisive. What is important is that the total factual
context is assessed in light of the pertinent common-law agency principles.
390 U.S. at 258.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 381(d)(1) (1970).
99. See Note, supra note 26, at 318.
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CONCLUSION

Following the Northwestern States decision, Congress enacted
Public Law 86-272 in an effort to eliminate the uncertainty and
concern among multistate businessmen. The statute imposed a
minimum activity standard precluding state taxation of foreign corporations engaged solely in the solicitation of orders for the sale of
tangible personal property within the taxing state. The failure of the
statute to define solicitation, however, has created additional uncertainty among courts, tax administrators, and taxpayers alike.
Judicial interpretations of solicitation have differed among the
states, creating a real risk of multiple taxation on the same income.'00 In addition, confusion regarding tax liability has caused
many marginal taxpayers to fail to file returns at all.' °' Certainly a
clarification of the solicitation concept is needed.
As Justice Frankfurter observed in the Northwestern States
decision, the legislative branch of the government is better suited
to afford this clarification than are the courts."°2 The accommodation of the states' right to tax and the national interest in unobstructed commerce is a delicate matter, requiring the research and
statistical resources peculiarly available to Congress. The legislators
accordingly should afford a statutory definition of solicitation that
would eliminate the uncertainty and disparity of interpretation that
now exists. For maximum effectiveness, this jurisdictional standard
should be coupled with a uniform income allocation formula that
would eliminate the possibility of multiple taxation." 3
If Congress fails to act, however, a decision by the United
States Supreme Court interpreting solicitation would be helpful in
bringing uniformity to the area. In the recent decision of Heublein,
Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,'"4 the Court peripherally
addressed the solicitation question but offered no definition of the
100. For example, Missouri has adopted a broad interpretation of solicitation in the
Ciba Pharmaceuticalsdecision while Oregon, in the Herff Jones case, has developed a very
restricted construction of the term. Suppose, therefore, that a Missouri corporation is engaged
in interstate commerce in Oregon. It is very possible that Oregon courts would find that
taxpayer's activities in that state exceed solicitation, disqualifying taxpayer for the exemption. At the same time, Missouri may find that taxpayer's activities in Oregon are within the
definition of solicitation and exempt from taxation in Oregon; therefore, Missouri would
refuse to permit taxpayer to apportion its income to Oregon. In this manner, taxpayer's
income generated from its operations in Oregon would be taxed twice-once by Oregon and
again by Missouri.
101. See H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 597 (1964).
102. 358 U.S. 450, 476 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
103. H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 481-516 (1964).
104. 409 U.S. 275 (1972).
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term.' 5 Resting its decision on the twenty-first amendment, the
Court held that a state constitutionally may require foreign corporations engaged in the sale of liquor to perform certain acts that exceed solicitation within the taxing state and necessarily to forfeit
the protection of Public Law 86-272.
If the Supreme Court decides to give its sanction either to the
broad interpretation of Ciba Pharmaceuticalsor to the narrow definition of Herff Jones in defining solicitation, the Court should adopt
the narrow standard. First, the narrow interpretation is in consonance with a literal reading of the statutory language, which requires that solicitation be the only activity conducted by the taxpayer within the taxing state. Secondly, the narrow definition of
solicitation is supported by the weight of authority among state
courts that have addressed the issue. Thirdly, the narrow definition
gives the courts a more efficient standard with which to work. Employing the narrow definition of solicitation, courts must decide
merely whether the activities in question exceed solicitation; if they
do, the tax exemption is unavailable. On the other hand, under the
broad definition of solicitation the court would be required to decide
not only whether taxpayer's activities exceeded solicitation per se,
but also whether the activities were "lesser, included pha~es" of
solicitation. For administrative simplicity, therefore, the narrow
definition of solicitation seems a much more workable standard.
Admittedly, the adoption of a restricted interpretation of solicitation reduces the availability of an already limited ta' exemption.
Multistate business interests undoubtedly would prefer the adoption of the more generous broad interpreatation of solicitation. Perhaps their displeasure resulting from a judicial adoption of the narrow definition of solicitation would spur Congress into action.
Alternative jurisdictional rules that depart completely from the
solicitation standard have been suggested, but no solution has been
found that fails to involve a balancing of interests. In order to guide
both taxpayers and state tax administrators in tax planning, Congress should weigh these interests and provide a more workable
jurisdictional standard regulating state jurisdiction to tax interstate
commerce, since the present guidelines provided by Public Law 86272 have failed to enunciate clear and workable criteria for exempt105. The court cited both the Smith Kline decision, which afforded a broad interpretation of solicitation, and the Clairol decision, which adopted a narrow interpretation. The
Supreme Court, however, failed to express its approval of either interpretation of the term.
Id. at 278.
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ing certain multistate businesses from unduly burdensome state
income taxes.
JOHN SHANNON BRYANT

